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The benefits of vaccines are globally acknowledged. Nevertheless, periodic concerns emerge regarding adverse 
events following immunisation (AEFI). Newly 
developed vaccines have incomplete safety 
profiles at the time of licensure because of 
limited participant enrolment in clinical trials 
and short duration of safety surveillance. 
Trials usually omit the vulnerable populations 
targeted by government vaccination 
programmes, including infants, pregnant 
women and the elderly. Common and acute 
reactions are readily identified, while rare and 
delayed AEFI may be missed without further 
assessment. 
Without thorough assessment of all AEFI, 
appropriate government, regulatory and 
manufacturer action cannot be taken. 
Community confidence in immunisation 
benefits may waiver, resulting in reduced 
vaccine coverage, as became apparent for 
human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination 
in Denmark1,2 and Japan3; and disease 
resurgence, as occurred with the measles–
mumps–rubella vaccine in the United 
Kingdom.4,5
To detect AEFI and mitigate the impact of 
any suspected concerns, the World Health 
Organization advocates all countries 
implement a post-licensure vaccine safety 
surveillance system.6 One recommended 
approach is a passive surveillance system 
(PSS), relying on reports submitted 
to regulatory agencies from health 
professionals, industry and community. 
One PSS aim is ‘signal detection’, and this 
is undertaken by the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration in Australia. Collated AEFI 
reports are examined for patterns involving 
specific or groups of vaccines that may 
then need further investigation. However, 
as reports are generally non-mandatory, 
considerable under-reporting exists and 
is coupled with difficulty in determining 
numbers of administered vaccines. Signal 
evaluation is compromised, impeding 
assessment of a causal association between 
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a vaccine and adverse event. Data linkage, 
or the matching and joining of records 
from administrative datasets, has been 
extensively used internationally, as a means 
of safety assessment. In the United States 
and Scandinavian countries, analysis of 
linked data has been used to both identify 
and refute associations between specific 
vaccines and adverse outcomes.7-10 A whole-
of-population linked dataset enhances the 
scope, representativeness and population size 
for epidemiological assessments of vaccine 
safety. 
Australia is well placed to employ data 
linkage for safety assessment of vaccines. 
Since 1996, routine childhood immunisations 
have been captured on the Australian 
Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR), 
which was extended to all ages as the 
Australian Immunisation Register (AIR) in 
2016. Adolescent human papillomavirus 
(HPV) immunisations have been recorded on 
the HPV Register since 2007, with data also 
integrated with AIR since late 2018. These 
registries have potential to be linked with 
other administrative data collections, such 
as jurisdictional hospital datasets and the 
National Death Index (NDI), to enable signal 
evaluation. However, application of linked 
administrative datasets for vaccine safety 
monitoring in Australia has been limited to 
a single investigation, the South Australian 
Vaccine Safety (SAVeS) study.11 
In late 2008, a team of investigators embarked 
on the Australian Research Council-funded 
study VALiD. The study objective was to 
investigate the acceptability and feasibility 
of linking Australian Government (hereafter 
AusGov) and jurisdictional data collections 
to evaluate the safety of vaccines. Two 
policy developments preceded project 
commencement. Firstly in 2006, the National 
Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy 
(NCRIS) identified population health and 
data linkage as a key priority for research 
investment. Enhanced data linkage capability 
was anticipated to expedite epidemiological 
research, leading to improvements in 
clinical practice and delivery of health 
and social services.12 Secondly, two new 
vaccines were included on the NIP in 2007: 
a second-generation rotavirus vaccine 
(RV) protecting against diarrhoeal disease 
in children, and the HPV vaccine against 
cervical cancer. The nascent safety profiles 
of these vaccines warranted post-licensure 
surveillance, particularly since first-generation 
RVs were withdrawn in the US following 
identification of the vaccine’s increased risk 
of intussusception (bowel obstruction).13-15 
Safety data for the HPV vaccine were also 
limited due to its recent introduction, with 
Australia the first country to include the 
vaccine in a funded national schedule.
This paper describes the complexities 
encountered in accessing cross-jurisdictional 
data for linkage with the ACIR to establish 
a national linked dataset for vaccine 
safety evaluation. We suggest a series of 
recommendations for improving access and 
timely delivery of linked datasets to enhance 
safety surveillance.
Methods
Data sources
Eleven data sources from two federal and 
five jurisdictional agencies were identified 
for linkage in the VALiD study (Table 1). 
Linkage occurred in stages due to delays in 
approval for release of jurisdictional data. 
Two project datasets were created with 
the ACIR as the primary data source: 1) a 
national linkage with death registration 
records from the NDI (1999–2010); and 2) 
a cross-jurisdictional linkage with hospital 
inpatient and emergency department (ED) 
attendance records (2003–2013) from four of 
five jurisdictions: South Australia, New South 
Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Western 
Australia (WA) withdrew in the final stages of 
approval (December 2015), citing legislative 
restrictions preventing release of hospital 
data to external agencies. Established in 
1996, the ACIR maintains records of all 
immunisations (specified by the National 
Immunisation Schedule) administered to 
children up to 7 years of age. This includes 
up to 21 separate vaccinations, protecting 
against 14 diseases, which are administered 
at six intervals during childhood.16 The ACIR 
records child name, address, demographic 
information, aboriginality, immunisation 
history (including vaccine administered, date 
of immunisation, dose and batch number) 
and provider contact information.
Linkage methodology – the model we 
proposed
Initially, we proposed linking datasets by 
replicating the methodology implemented 
for the SAVeS project,11,17 where linkage of 
immunisation and hospital data for South 
Australian (SA) children was conducted 
by the SA Department of Health (SADH). 
When meeting with AusGov agencies 
(November 2009), we presented two linkage 
models: a centralised model involving SADH 
taking responsibility for linking all required 
datasets and a distributed model, where 
ACIR identifiers would be sent to individual 
jurisdictions to perform state-based 
linkage with hospital data. However, a new 
policy introduced by the Commonwealth 
Department of Health required a different 
linkage methodology for AusGov data. 
Launched as ‘High Level Principles for Data 
Integration involving Commonwealth Data’ in 
February 2010,18 this policy stated linkage of 
AusGov datasets could only be undertaken by 
an approved agency or ‘integrating authority’. 
At the time of application, two integrating 
authorities had received accreditation for 
linking AusGov data: the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics and the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare (AIHW), with the latter 
subsequently assigned as the linkage agency 
for the VALiD project. 
Linkage methodology – the model 
prescribed by the Australian 
Government
The best practice protocol for data linkage 
stipulates that person identifiers (name, 
address, demographic) used for matching 
information between administrative datasets 
should be kept separate from those relating 
to an individual’s health information (e.g. 
immunisations, deaths, hospitalisations).19 
This ‘separation principle’ ensures individuals’ 
confidentiality and privacy are protected, 
with linkage staff having no access to 
health information components. Similarly, 
researchers never receive access to person 
identifiers, preventing potential matching 
of health information to specific individuals. 
Table 1: Data collections linked for the VALiD study.
Jurisdiction Dataset name
Commonwealth Australian Childhood Immunisation Register
AIHW National Death Index
QLD Hospital Admitted Patient Data Collection
Emergency Department Information System
Mater Hospital Emergency Department 
Information System
NSW Admitted Patient Data Collection
Emergency Department Data Collection 
SA Integrated South Australian Activity 
Collection 
Emergency Department Data Collection
WA Hospital Morbidity Data Collection 
Emergency Department Data Collection
VIC Victorian Admitted Episodes Dataset 
Victorian Emergency Minimum Dataset
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Following matching of identifiers, a national 
linkage key (NLK) was generated and sent to 
data custodians to attach health information. 
The NLK comprised two identification 
numbers – a new Person ID and encrypted 
Local Record ID assigned by the data 
custodian with the latter removed following 
attachment of health data. 
The AIHW implemented a variation to best 
practice linking methodology in handling 
AusGov data, receiving both identifier 
and health data extracts. Within the AIHW, 
partitioning of extracts was achieved by 
having separate data processing domains for 
receipt of identifier information and health 
data. Following linkage, integrated data were 
sent to a secure, remote access computing 
facility known as ‘SURE’ (Secure Unified 
Research Environment), hosted by the Sax 
Institute in NSW.
Results
Process and scope of approvals for 
data access
Figure 1 outlines the process, scope of 
approvals and agreements required before 
data linkage could proceed. Extensive 
negotiation was required between 18 
different agencies to obtain 21 separate 
authorisations and 12 ethics approvals. 
Approvals were needed from four domains: 
Australian Government agencies, state-based 
authorities, ancillary organisations comprising 
linkage and data curating facilities, and 
human research ethics committees (HRECs). 
The process commenced with developing a 
study protocol and initial ethics submission 
to the University HREC. While the submission 
was under review, approval for data release 
was first sought from the AusGov Department 
of Health. Release of ACIR immunisation data 
for linkage and analysis required three tiers 
of approval: legislative, policy authority and 
administrative. Legislative approval involved 
review of the relevant Commonwealth 
statute (Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth)) 
regulating the function and management 
of ACIR. While disclosure of immunisation 
information was permitted in a restricted 
range of circumstances, including research, 
only non-identifiable information could be 
released. Non-identifiable data, however, 
are impracticable for data linkage activities 
that require person identifiers for dataset 
matching. Consequently, approval in the form 
of a Public Interest Certificate (PIC) signed by 
the data custodian, or their delegate, was 
Figure 1: Overview of process and range of approvals/agreements required for securing release of 
cross‐jurisdictional and Commonwealth data for linkage 
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Figure 1: Overview of process and range of approvals/agreements required for securing release of cross-
jurisdictional and Commonwealth data for linkage.
necessary to provide legislative exemption to 
data release protections.
Before delegate approval could be granted, 
policy authority was required from the 
relevant AusGov section with procedural 
responsibility for the ACIR dataset. During 
this process, overall project objectives and 
proposed methodology were reviewed by 
the Immunisation Branch together with 
an assessment of the risks of data release 
weighed against the potential public 
benefit of data provision. Procedural review 
for the VALiD project progressed through 
four levels of governance to achieve policy 
authorisation. In-principle approval for 
release of ACIR data for the VALiD project 
was granted in February 2011, some 2.5 years 
after project commencement. A further 14 
months ensued before the PIC, authorising 
release of the immunisation register data, was 
conferred in April 2012. Our ARC competitive 
grant ended in 2010. 
The final AusGov authorisation before 
data release to AIHW involved approval 
from the Commonwealth Department of 
Human Services (DHS). This Department 
had administrative responsibility for the 
dataset and was ultimately responsible for 
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preparing and sending the data extract 
to the assigned integrating authority. This 
required a further application to the Medicare 
External Requests Review Committee and, 
while timely approval was secured, a further 
year ensued before data were extracted 
and transferred to the AIHW in May 2013. 
Additional requirements supplementary 
to the Commonwealth process included 
completion of Confidentiality Deed Polls for 
those investigators accessing data.
In summary, provision of AusGov approval 
took almost four years from the initial request 
for data access in August 2008, with a further 
year before ACIR data were transferred to 
the AIHW for the first linkage. An additional 
14 months was required for linkage and 
provision of data, due to re-issue of ACIR 
data following identification of data integrity 
issues related to same-individual duplications 
in person identifier number. This process 
was completed in August 2014, six years 
after our initial consultation with the AusGov 
Department of Health. 
Jurisdictional and ethics approvals
The jurisdictional request process was 
similarly multi-layered and protracted 
(Table 2). Broadly, this involved agency 
consultation, identifying required datasets, 
selecting relevant variables, completion of 
a data application (and additional forms 
where necessary), securing data custodian 
approval and, finally, ethics application. No 
two jurisdictions were the same in their 
approach to sanctioning data release. Time 
to securing data release ranged from nine 
months in NSW, to more than four years 
for Victorian data. In NSW, the application 
process required receipt of the AusGov PIC 
documentation before an ethics application 
could be submitted, delaying completion of 
state approval processes until secured. 
As well as being non-uniform, the extent of 
documentation varied between jurisdictions, 
sometimes involving a single application 
form (such as Queensland’s Public Health 
Application) to additional documents 
such as Privacy Forms (NSW) and technical 
feasibility assessments (NSW, WA, SA). In SA, 
QLD and WA, executive approvals were also 
required for trans-border flow of data to the 
AIHW and/or release of data from hospital 
area health services. Due to differences 
in hospital funding arrangements, two 
application processes for release of hospital 
data were undertaken in QLD involving the 
QLD Health Statistics Unit and Mater Health 
Services (ED data only from former Mater 
Children’s Hospital) with the latter requiring 
considerable documentation. 
Multiple ethics approvals were also required. 
The significant delay in acquiring approval 
for data release from the ACIR delayed 
submissions for release of state hospital 
data, effectively separating our research 
objectives into two projects and two 
separate linkage processes. Submissions 
included two Commonwealth, six state, 
two institutional and two linkage agency 
applications. This resulted in 12 (rather than 
nine) separate ethics submissions seeking 
approval of ACIR linkage with the NDI, and 
then hospital datasets. Three jurisdictions also 
required additional submissions to state-
based Aboriginal Health Ethics Committees 
for approval relating to the release of an 
Indigenous identifier. 
Other approvals and agreements
Other approvals and agreements included 
a (data) Risk Assessment completed by the 
AIHW and submitted to Commonwealth DHS. 
Researcher and institutional agreements 
were also needed for the linkage agency’s 
data storage facility (SURE). Confidentiality 
agreements with states were also required.
Data linkage methodology 
Three variations of the data linkage model 
were implemented across agencies 
contributing data. Model 1 involving NSW, 
QLD Health and SA complied strictly with 
the best practice protocol.19 Each jurisdiction 
only supplied AIHW with hospital-derived 
person identifiers for linkage with ACIR 
identifiers. The resulting NLK was then 
returned to jurisdictions for appending 
health data extracts, then uploaded to SURE. 
Model 2 involved supply of AusGov ACIR 
data and QLD Mater ED data. These agencies 
sent both person identifier and health data 
extracts to separate domains within AIHW. 
Following processing and linkage, health data 
extracts were similarly attached to the NLK 
before transfer to SURE. Model 3 applied to 
linkage of Victorian hospital data. Provisional 
enquiries seeking access to Victorian hospital 
data commenced in November 2009. 
However, these negotiations were suspended 
until September 2012, when AusGov approval 
for release of immunisation data was assured. 
Initially, person identifier variables from the 
Victorian hospital datasets and approved 
health data extracts were to be supplied to 
the AIHW as described for Model 1. Identifier 
variables were restricted to date of birth, 
gender, postcode and residential suburb. 
During consultation, the ‘Better Patient 
Data’ project, designed to improve linkage 
specificity, was undertaken by the Victorian 
Department of Health in 2014. This initiative 
expanded the range of identifiers available 
from the Patient Master Index of Victorian 
hospitals and involved adding names and 
addresses to retrospective data holdings from 
all Victorian hospitals. The expanded person 
identifier set was made available to the AIHW 
in late 2016, while health data from Victorian 
hospitals were derived from AIHW hospital 
data collections, to be added to the NLK, 
creating the third linkage model.
Datasets
Variation in data characteristics and variable 
formats were also noted across jurisdictional 
data sources. For example, state hospital 
datasets varied in availability of named data 
for linkage, limiting observation periods. In 
WA, for example, named separations data 
from public hospitals were from 1970; in QLD, 
only from 1995. In SA, named separations 
data were available from July 2003 onwards 
and for Victoria from mid-2010, although 
work is ongoing to expand named data back 
to mid-2005. Another inconsistency related to 
data variables released. Specific justifications 
were required for release of date of birth so 
that researchers could apply the most basic of 
epidemiological analyses – age adjustments 
– to ensure comparability of risks relative to 
age for AEFI. Most states prevented release 
of the postcode variable, instead providing 
a coded measure of geographic location 
and socioeconomic status for health data. 
However, coded measures were inconsistent 
across jurisdictions, with some states 
providing broader geographic locations such 
as statistical local areas. 
Cost
Various costs were associated with creating 
the two linkage datasets. These included 
costs (GST exclusive) for ACIR (linkage 1: 
$9,580; linkage 2: $6,588) and state data 
extracts ($0 in SA, QLD & VIC and $34,000 in 
NSW), linkage services (linkage 1: $18,900; 
linkage 2: $59,600) and access to the SURE 
facility over four years ($31,233). Excluding 
indirect personnel time in administrating 
approvals, direct costs for the VALiD study 
totalled almost $126,000, although the 
true cost was higher due to all jurisdictions 
absorbing fees for data extracts. Final 
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personnel costs during the application 
stage were difficult to estimate, as research 
personnel prepared other study components 
in addition to the data linkage applications 
and negotiation of approvals. Conservatively, 
we estimate personnel time expended on 
approval activities across the six state and 
Commonwealth jurisdictions was one year’s 
duration – equivalent to $95,000 base salary 
with on-costs for a mid-level research person.
Discussion
This paper describes the complex and 
convoluted application, approval and 
operational processes to link cross-
jurisdictional and AusGov data to establish 
a national linked dataset for vaccine safety 
signal evaluation. The cost (direct and 
personnel) and time to secure approvals 
for data linkage in Australia is clearly 
impractical for routine or even periodic safety 
monitoring of vaccines. This is concerning, 
given the importance of the public regard 
for safe vaccines.20-23 In earlier studies, 
the investigators identified considerable 
parental support (94%) for linking their 
child’s vaccination and hospital records 
for vaccine safety surveillance, with high 
confidence (84%) in identity protections.23 
Parents also emphasised the public benefits 
of generating knowledge on potential harms, 
which prevailed over concerns regarding 
permissions for data access.24 Our experience 
demonstrates the disconnect between 
public attitudes and the reality of what can 
be achieved with administrative data in 
Australia. While data protection is important, 
it needs to be balanced against the significant 
public health advantages arising from linking 
data and adding value to an existing and 
government-funded resource – the Australian 
immunisation registers. 
Key findings 
Investment in Australia’s data linkage 
infrastructure has expanded availability of 
administrative data for health research.25 
However, practical access to these data 
is limited by considerable administrative 
burdens and delays for researchers. The 
experience of the VALiD investigators in 
establishing a national integrated dataset 
for safety assessment of vaccines identified 
three key areas of complexity in securing 
data for cross-jurisdictional projects involving 
Commonwealth and state data. These relate 
to: 1) distributed dataset access; 2) variable 
Table 2: Stages of jurisdictional application process and associated application documentation. 
NSW QLD QLD Mater SA VIC WA
Planning
Consultation ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Preparation of application documentation
Site Specific Application Form ♦
Public Health Application form ♦
Data application form ♦ ♦ ♦* ♦
Data services form(s) ♦
Variable list form(s) ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
List of ICD codes ♦
Privacy form ♦ ♦
Documentation of funding notification ♦ ♦
Research protocol ♦ ♦ ♦
Ethics application ♦ ♦ ♦* ♦
Review of draft application ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Supporting documentation ♦ ♦
In-principle data custodian support ♦
Technical feasibility assessment form ♦ ♦
Data custodian approval ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Declaration of confidentiality ♦
Indemnity ♦
Investigator CVs ♦ 
Ethical review
Ethics approval ♦ MA MA ♦ ♦ ♦
Indigenous ethics approval ♦ ♦ ♦
Allied approvals
Executive approval ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦(4)
Final data custodian approval ♦
Confidentiality Agreement ♦ ♦ ♦
Research Agreement ♦
Total application/approval documents 8 1 8 4 2 16
Notes:
*Data request negotiated directly with data custodian with ethics approval secured through ethics application.
MA=Mutual acceptance of ethics approval
and frequently non-transparent application 
processes; and 3) lengthy approval times 
involving multiple tiers of authorisation (Table 
3). While detailed as separate challenges, 
these issues are all entwined, and arise from 
the distributed operational responsibility for 
healthcare in Australia. 
Hospitalisations, for example, are 
administered by jurisdictions, while federal 
programs such as the National Immunisation 
Program and the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Schedule are administered by AusGov 
agencies. Researchers need to negotiate 
approvals with individual jurisdictional and 
national agencies to obtain authorisation for 
data release and/or use. Complex and lengthy 
application processes ensue, progressing 
through multiple tiers of authorisation for 
data release approvals. Further obstacles 
arise through the non-uniform application 
process, with no two jurisdictions alike in 
their requirements, leading to differences 
in application stages (1–4), application 
documents (1–16) and time to approval for 
data release – ranging from nine months to 
six years. Complicating the negotiations were 
variations in willingness to release specific 
health data variables, particularly those 
deemed sensitive and with potential for re-
identification of individuals, e.g. postcode. 
Transparency in the application processes 
also varied. At the Commonwealth level, the 
application process was opaque and lacked 
coordination between AusGov agencies, with 
limited information provided by agencies 
on sequence and timing of government 
approvals. The delay in securing AusGov 
authorisations also delayed approvals from 
state agencies. Applications could not be 
commenced or progressed in one jurisdiction 
without receipt of the PIC approving release 
of data from ACIR, the primary data source. 
One further concerning feature was the 
decision not to release hospital data in 
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one jurisdiction (WA) at the final approval 
stage involving WA formal data custodian 
endorsement. This happened despite 
our investigators completing extensive 
application documentation and securing six 
individual (ethics and governance) approvals. 
Collectively, these challenges create 
substantial time and resource commitments 
for researchers brokering approvals to 
achieve data release. Furthermore, as data 
were no longer current by the time of 
data release, revised submissions became 
necessary to obtain more recent data. The 
challenges encountered in seeking to link 
cross-jurisdictional data are not isolated to 
the current study, with parallels also seen 
in a two-state immunisation effectiveness 
study and a national injury surveillance 
study.26-28 The difficulties encountered raise 
significant ethical concerns about wasting 
public research funds and serious concerns 
regarding the feasibility of undertaking 
research of significant public benefit due to 
uncoordinated and disparate governance 
structures. The 2017 Productivity Commission 
Data Availability and Use Inquiry Report29 
(‘PC Report’) further emphasise that delays 
in data access impact on researchers’ ability 
to provide real-world evidence on topics of 
concern.
Recommendations
A simpler, more transparent application and 
approvals model for release and linkage of 
Commonwealth and jurisdictional data is 
urgently needed to ensure researcher efforts 
and resources are directed to investigating 
study objectives rather than negotiating 
the approval pathway. A uniform model 
of managing approvals would also reduce 
the burden experienced by data custodians 
when assessing and approving dataset 
requests. Four principal recommendations are 
proposed to simplify data access and reduce 
time to data approval and release. These are 
to:
1. Prioritise access to high-utility data 
collections, e.g. jurisdictional hospital 
separations/ED presentations, national 
registries, Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
(PBS), Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS). 
2. Establish multiple portals (state-specific or 
institutional organisations) for managing 
approvals and data release of high-utility 
data. 
3. Simplify data and ethics applications to a 
single application process supported by a 
uniform template for assessing risks of data 
release.
4. Implement a web-based electronic system 
with facility for monitoring progress of 
data requests, approvals, data extract 
preparation, linkage and data release.
Implementation of these recommendations 
would benefit researchers and assist data 
custodians in streamlining processes for data 
access. Situating Australian Government 
high-value datasets across multiple approved 
agencies with a uniform application template 
would: 1) clearly identify a nominated 
agency(ies) for data release approvals, 
thereby reducing burden (and waiting times) 
related to repeated requests for AusGov 
datasets with Commonwealth Departments; 
2) resolve recursive legislative and policy 
reviews through a standing agreement with 
AusGov agencies pre-specifying conditions 
of data release; 3) reduce the cost of data 
extracts; 4) establish data dictionaries 
consistent with minimum dataset templates; 
and thereby 5) provide a uniform format 
for release of data variables from cross-
jurisdictional and national data holdings. 
Analytic environments
Allied with our recommendations is an 
appeal for expanding the options for secure 
analytic environments used to manage 
and access integrated data. Researchers are 
currently constrained by computing and 
analysis environments pre-determined by 
data custodial agencies. These environments 
are inflexible to meet the evolving analytical 
requirements of researchers. As research 
questions become more complex and the 
scope of datasets expands, computing 
infrastructure in the existing environment 
will be insufficient for enhanced processing 
of multiple extremely large datasets and 
running complex statistical models. As 
suggested in one submission30 to the PC 
Inquiry, institutions could provide a more 
flexible analysis facility for trusted users 
working with linked data. Through an 
accreditation mechanism, institutions would 
need to demonstrate appropriate security 
access measures, auditing of file access and 
transfer are in place. Allowing accredited 
institutions to establish secure computing 
environments employing cloud-based 
storage software, rather than requiring 
physical servers,31 would also defray some of 
the significant (and increasing) costs related 
to accessing linked data. 
Reforming data sharing and release
The propositions outlined above align with 
recommendations detailed in the PC Report29 
and proposed Australian Government 
reforms32 responding to the PC Report. 
Reforms would be legislated through the 
new Data Sharing and Release Bill.33 The 
Bill aims to increase authorised sharing 
and release of Australian Government-held 
data while improving data safeguards and 
risk management tools to create a more 
transparent environment for data sharing.33 
Planned reforms for improving data sharing 
and release arrangements include identifying 
high-value data collections, creating 
Accredited Data Authorities to facilitate data 
provision, and implementing a trusted user 
framework for assessing data requests.32 
High-value data collections with potential 
for delivering population benefits would be 
designated as National Interest Datasets and 
given priority access. 
Accredited Data Authorities (ADAs) building 
on the current Integrating Authorities model 
would expand the network of agencies 
with facility for linking, sharing or releasing 
datasets. These Accredited Authorities 
would act as intermediaries between data 
custodians and users to facilitate data 
availability,29,32 including national datasets 
identified as high-value. Feasibly, ADAs could 
be assigned to existing state-based linkage 
units but also serve as an opportunity for 
other non-government agencies to expand 
their role to data provision. Increasing the 
number of agencies available to distribute 
high-value data on behalf of data custodians 
would considerably reduce the bottleneck 
associated with obtaining approvals, access 
Table 3: Summary of complexities and recommendations for improving data release.
Issue Recommendations
Fragmented dataset access leading to separate 
administrative responsibilities for national and 
cross-national data collections 
Locate high-utility data collections in a designated repositories through a 
memorandum of understanding or standing agreement involving state and 
Australian Government departments
Protracted approval for data release arising from 
multiple tiers of authorisation with transparency 
lacking on time to approval and data release 
Electronic system integrating data application process and monitoring progress 
of approvals, data preparation, linkage and release.
Variable and sometimes non-transparent 
application processes across jurisdictions 
Single application process situated at repository with one uniform application 
form
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and release of data currently experienced 
with the AIHW.
To increase transparency of approvals and 
streamline application processes, data 
access would be assessed by ADAs applying 
the ‘trusted user’ model, based on the Five 
Safes Framework.32 Originally intended for 
identified data with scope broadened to 
include deidentified data, the Framework 
comprises five principles or dimensions of 
data access to inform a process of safe data 
release.34 These are: Safe projects (Can the 
researchers be trusted?); Safe people (Is the 
purpose of use appropriate? What analysis 
is being done?); Safe data (Can the data 
disclose identity?); Safe settings (Does the 
access environment prevent unauthorised 
use?); and Safe outputs (Are the statistical 
results non-disclosive?).34,35 The Five Safes 
provide a clearly articulated approach for 
assessing data requests; noting, however, 
that the five principles already underpin 
specifications outlined in current data and 
ethics applications. If uniformly applied by 
data custodians as a singular ‘template’, the 
framework would provide a transparent and 
simplified mechanism for managing data 
applications and also ethical review of linked 
data requests. In turn, the template would 
reduce burden of application review for data 
custodians and ethics committees as well 
as duplication of applications submitted by 
researchers. 
The trusted user data model has been 
adopted by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics36 and the AIHW, with some states 
(Victoria and SA) also implementing this 
model for sharing data across government 
agencies.35 Trusted users would be aligned 
with institutions (e.g. government agencies, 
universities) with existing arrangements for 
managing improper data use. Arrangements 
include agreeing to legal undertakings 
specifying protections for data use and 
having necessary computing infrastructure 
for storing data securely.37 
Monitoring data requests, approvals 
and release
Regarding our recommendation for a 
web-based monitoring system, some 
elements such as progress in data requests 
and approvals are considered in the online 
application established by the Population 
Health Research Network (PHRN).38 The online 
application aims to harmonise application 
and approval processes for cross-jurisdictional 
and multi-jurisdictional research projects. 
Useful for complex linkages, the online 
process provides an opportunity for dataset 
representatives to collectively raise issues 
about the application rather than requiring 
separate discussions with individual linkage 
agencies. However, there remains concerns 
by these researchers that the PHRN adds yet 
another layer of application to an already 
convoluted application process. Despite the 
central application point, there still remains a 
requirement to complete ancillary approval 
documentation for all jurisdictions (with 
the exception of SA and TAS), rather than 
consolidating data access requests into a 
single uniform application.38
Programmatic linkages
Further considerations related to data access 
and data timeliness include establishing 
enduring (rather than ad hoc) linkages. 
The now-named Australian Immunisation 
Register (AIR) offers clear population benefits 
for evaluating the impact of immunisation. 
Linked with other datasets, the AIR could 
be established as a routine and enduring 
programmatic linkage for monitoring the 
effectiveness and safety of vaccines. An 
immunisation programmatic linkage could 
contribute to a national system of other 
programmatic linkages involving National 
Interest Datasets. Programmatic linkages 
could be managed by ADAs located across 
and between government, non-government 
and academic sectors.29,32 Inter-sectorial 
programmatic linkages, would also remove 
redundancy of repeated linkages of datasets. 
More critically, they would enable rapid and 
real-time safety surveillance to be conducted 
for vaccines, particularly seasonal or new 
vaccines introduced on the NIP. 
Implications for public health 
The delay and complexity in accessing linked 
data for vaccine safety surveillance has both 
local and global public health implications. 
Firstly, it results in an inability to undertake 
timely epidemiological reviews to examine 
associations between reported serious events 
and a vaccine. This is particularly critical for 
newly licensed vaccines. Surveillance of AEFI 
and response to safety concerns provide the 
community with assurances that vaccines 
are appropriately regulated by the Australian 
Government. This, in turn, engenders public 
confidence and contributes to the success 
of vaccination programs through ongoing 
participation. Other work by the project 
researchers has established community 
preference for employing linked data for 
public benefit, including vaccine safety 
monitoring, over and above preferences for 
individual consent and privacy concerns 
relating to the use of identifiable data.22-24 
Secondly, countries differ in the selection 
and timing of vaccine administration. As 
vaccine trials are usually conducted outside 
Australia, information on possible safety 
issues derived from these trials may lack 
comparability with the Australian population. 
Routine surveillance following vaccine 
administration is therefore important for 
providing local knowledge on AEFI, including 
their incidence, occurrence and type. Thirdly, 
the World Health Organization advocates 
surveillance for AEFI as part of global efforts 
to enhance safety information across diverse 
populations, particularly for rare outcomes. 
Well-resourced countries like Australia, with 
strict regulatory controls on therapeutic 
products and a reputation for early adoption 
of new vaccines, have a role to play in these 
efforts by providing safety data on routinely 
administered vaccines. 
Conclusion
Integration of immunisation registers with 
other data collections is achievable in 
Australia but remains infeasible for routine 
and rapid identification of vaccine safety 
concerns. Multiple lengthy authorisation 
requirements, convoluted application 
processes and inconsistencies in data 
supplied all contribute to delayed data 
availability. Prioritising access to national 
and jurisdictional datasets of high value, a 
single application process with transparent 
assessment of data requests and an electronic 
system for monitoring progress of approvals 
and data release would expedite data access. 
This would lead to a surveillance system that 
is rapid and responsive to monitoring vaccine 
safety concerns. Furthermore, data would 
be available for external parties to provide a 
measure of accountability for policy decisions, 
independent of government assessment.
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